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Factor Returns and Circular Causality 
Haiwen Zhou1 
Abstract 
 The presence of circular causality in a region through factor returns is studied in a general 
equilibrium model in which firms producing final products engage in oligopolistic competition.  
The intermediate input is produced by capital and labor with a constant returns to scale 
technology.  If the degree of increasing returns in the production of final products is sufficiently 
high, the return to a factor can increase with the amount of this factor.  Thus a higher amount of a 
factor in a region leads to a higher return to this factor and attracts additional amount of this 
factor to move in.  Capital movement and labor movement can be reinforcing.  This type of 
circular causality means that unbalanced regional development can persist over time.   
 
Keywords: Factor return, circular causation, increasing returns, oligopolistic competition, 
intermediate input 
 
JEL Classification Numbers: O10, R10 
 
1. Introduction 
With constant returns to scale in production and perfect competition, the return to a factor 
of production is determined by its marginal productivity.  When the amount of a factor increases, 
other things equal, the marginal productivity of this factor decreases and the return to this factor 
decreases.  Since developed countries and cities have higher ratios of capital to labor than 
developing countries and rural areas, we may expect that capital will move from developed 
countries to developing countries and from cities to rural areas.  This expectation is valid in some 
cases.  For example, before World War I, with its abundant supply of capital and high ratio of 
capital to labor, Britain invested heavily in other countries (Williamson, 2006).  Also, some 
developing countries with low ratio of capital to labor such as China receive billions of dollars of 
capital inflow in recent years (Huang, 2005).  However, capital does not necessarily flow from 
developed countries to developing countries (Lucas, 1990).  Also, capital does not always flow 
from cities to rural areas (Jacobs, 1985).  Instead, developed countries and cities attract capital 
and labor.  In fact, if diminishing marginal returns were always valid, with factor mobility 
economic activities would be relatively uniformly distributed over space: cities may disappear 
and the huge income differences between developed countries and developing countries may 
disappear.  Thus at least under some conditions, returns to a factor of production can increase 
                                                 
1 I thank Leo Michelis, Laura Razzolini, and two anonymous referees for their detailed and insightful comments.  I 
am solely responsible for all the remaining errors. 
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with the amounts of this factor.2  Regional concentration of economic activities as a cumulative 
process is discussed in Myrdal (1957, 1968).  Myrdal argues that market forces may lead to 
production to be concentrated in given locations rather than dispersed uniformly across spaces.3   
In his discussion, capital mobility may contribute to the concentration of industries in given 
regions.  This may increase the return to capital and attract additional capital to move into those 
regions. 
In this paper, we study the conditions for the presence of circular causality through factor 
returns in a region in a general equilibrium model.  There is a continuum of final products.  Final 
products are produced by an intermediate input and the intermediate input is produced by both 
labor and capital with a constant returns to scale technology.4  The production of a final product 
requires a fixed cost.5  The existence of fixed cost is the source of increasing returns in the 
production of final products.6  The existence of fixed costs in the production of a final product 
also leads to imperfect competition in the sector producing final products.  More specifically, 
similar to Lahiri and Ono (1988, 1995, 2004) and Neary (2003), firms producing the same final 
product are assumed to engage in oligopolistic competition. 
We show that the return to a factor of production can increase with the amount of this 
factor in a region.  The reason is as follows.  In addition to the effect from a diminishing 
marginal product in the production of the intermediate input, there is one additional effect 
affecting the return to a factor: increasing returns to scale in the production of final products.  
While the diminishing marginal product tends to decrease the return to a factor, increasing 
returns in the production of final products tends to increase the return to a factor.  If the effect 
from increasing returns dominates the effect from the diminishing marginal product, the return to 
a factor increases with the amount of this factor in a region.  Thus a circular causality results: a 
higher amount of capital in a region increases the return to capital and attracts additional capital 
to move in; this increases the return to capital.  A higher amount of capital also increases the 
                                                 
2 Bai, Hsieh, and Qian (2006) show that even with high levels of investment over years in China, the return to 
capital in China is not low. 
3 Porter (1990) has a detailed discussion of various factors leading to the concentration of industries in various 
developed countries. 
4 Baldwin et al. (2003, chapter 8) provide a synthesis of the literature on economic geography based on the usage of 
intermediate inputs and vertical linkages. 
5 The importance of fixed costs in modern production is discussed in Chandler (1990). 
6 In this model, increasing returns are internal.  Holod and Reed (2009) study regional external economies.  Zhou 
(2007a) shows that the choice of technology can be a link between internal and external increasing returns. 
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return to labor.  If factor mobility is possible, capital mobility and labor mobility can be 
reinforcing.  This type of circular causality can lead to the concentration of economic activities in 
given regions.  As the return to a factor in a region with a lower ratio of this factor may not 
necessarily be higher, an undeveloped region can remain undeveloped for a long period of time. 
In the literature, Nurkse (1953) and Myrdal (1957, 1968) have illustrated the implications 
of circular causality on economic development.  Matsuyama (1995) provides a survey of models 
of cumulative processes based on monopolistic competition.  Baldwin et al. (2003) provide a 
discussion of various mechanisms of circular causation in which firms engage in monopolistic 
competition.  In a formal model, Krugman (1991) studies the location of economic activities in 
which firms producing manufactured products engage in monopolistic competition. 7   In 
Krugman (1991), labor is the only factor of production and firms are more interested in locating 
at a region with a larger market size.  As the number of varieties produced in a region increases, 
a lower price index means that the real income of a consumer is higher and this attracts workers 
to move into this region.  This leads to a process of circular causation.  In this model, the number 
of varieties of final products is fixed and firms producing final products engage in oligopolistic 
competition.  With oligopolistic competition, a firm’s scale of production increases with the size 
of the market and thus average cost decreases.  This change of a firm’s scale of production is the 
source of the benefit of locating at a region with larger amounts of factors of production.  By 
incorporating capital as a factor of production, we show that labor mobility and capital mobility 
can be reinforcing.  Rather than relying on computer simulations frequently used in the literature, 
results in this model are derived analytically. 
 The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 specifies the model and establishes the 
equilibrium conditions.  Section 3 explores the properties of the equilibrium.  Section 4 discusses 
some possible generalizations and extensions of the model and concludes. 
 
2. The model 
 In this section, we specify the model.  To make the intuition as clear as possible, we focus 
on a closed economy.  First, we study a representative consumer’s utility maximization.  Second, 
                                                 
7 While firms producing manufactured products engage in monopolistic competition in Krugman (1991), Zhou 
(2007b) studies a model of economic geography in which firms engage in oligopolistic competition.  Empirical 
research on economic geography include Ciccone (2002) and Head and Mayor (2004).  Neary (2001) and Baldwin 
et al. (2003) provide assessments of the literature on economic geography.   
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we study firms’ profit maximization, including profit maximization for a firm producing the 
intermediate input and the profit maximization for a firm producing a final product.  Finally, we 
establish the market clearing conditions, including factor markets and product markets clearing 
conditions. 
 There is a continuum of final products indexed by a number ]1,0[ .  All final products 
are assumed to have the same costs of production and enter a consumer’s utility function in the 
same way.8  A representative consumer’s consumption of the product   is )(c  and her utility 
function is specified as  dcU )(ln
1
0 .  The wage rate is w .  The return to capital is r  and 
the amount of capital in this economy is K .9  It is assumed that capital is equally owned by all 
the L  residents in this economy.  A consumer’s income is the sum of her wage income and her 
income as a capital owner.  Thus a consumer’s total income is )/( LrKw  .  The price of the 
final product   is )(p .  A consumer’s budget constraint is )/()()(
1
0
LrKwdcp   .  A 
consumer takes the wage rate, the return to capital, and the prices of final products as given and 
chooses quantities of consumption of final products to maximize her utility. 
The intermediate input is produced by capital and labor.  Total output of the intermediate 
input produced by all firms is Q .  For   denoting a constant between zero and one, output of the 
intermediate input is specified as   1KLQ .  Thus there are constant returns to scale in the 
production of the intermediate input.  Firms producing the intermediate input are assumed to 
engage in perfect competition.  The price of the intermediate input is Ip , I  for intermediate.  
For a firm producing the intermediate input, it takes the wage rate and the return to capital as 
given and chooses the amounts of labor and capital to maximize its profit wLrKKLpI  1 .  
To produce the intermediate input, the optimal choice of the amount of labor requires that 
                                                 
8 As discussed in Neary (2003), the main purpose of having a continuum of final products rather than one final 
product is to eliminate the market power of a firm producing a final product in the market for the intermediate 
product.  Otherwise, it can be viewed that there is only one final product.  When there is only one final product and 
there are only few firms producing it, a firm producing the final product is one of the small number of firms 
purchasing the intermediate input and will have market power in the market for the intermediate input.  With a 
continuum of final products, even though each final product is still produced by a small number of firms, a firm is 
only one of the infinite number of buyers of the intermediate input and does not have market power in the market for 
the intermediate input. 
9 With homothetic preferences, the distribution of ownership of capital does not affect the production pattern in this 
model. 
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     011  wKLpI  .            (1) 
The optimal choice of the amount of capital requires that 
     0)1(   rKLpI  .           (2) 
Final products are produced by using the intermediate input only.  For the product  , 
there are )(m  identical firms producing it.  Firms producing the same final product are 
assumed to engage in Cournot competition.  For each final product, the fixed cost is f  units of 
the intermediate input and the marginal cost is   units of the intermediate input.  For a firm 
producing a final product, if this firm’s output is x , its revenue is px  and its cost of purchasing 
the intermediate input is Ipxf )(  .  Thus its profit is Ipxfpx )(  .  A firm producing a 
final product takes the price of the intermediate input as given and chooses its output to 
maximize its profit.  This firm’s optimal choice of output requires that 
0

 Ipx
pxp  . 
 As the number of firms producing a final product is a real number rather than restricted to 
be an integer number, free entry into the production of final products leads to zero profits for a 
firm producing a final product:10 
     0)(  Ipxfpx  .            (3) 
 Total income in this economy is the sum of the labor income wL  and the capital income 
rK .  Thus total income is rKwL  .  Total value of a final product is pmx .  The clearance of the 
market for a final product requires that demand equals supply: 
     pmxrKwL  .            (4) 
 For a final product, each of the m  firms produces x  units of output and the total quantity 
of production is mx . Each of the L  consumers consumes mc  units of output and the total 
quantity of consumption is mLc .  In equilibrium mLcmx  .  In a Cournot equilibrium, when a 
firm chooses its level of output, it views the output of other firms as given.  With this in mind, by 
using the result that the absolute value of a consumer’s elasticity of demand for a final product is 
one, partial differentiation of mLcmx   with respect to p  leads to mpx  / .  Plugging this 
                                                 
10 Examples of oligopolistic competition with free entry include Mankiw and Whinston (1986), Brander (1995), 
Lahiri and Ono (1995), and Zhang (2007).   
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expression into a firm’s optimal output choice condition 0/  Ipxpxp   yields the 
familiar condition that a firm’s price is a markup over its marginal cost of production: 
     Ipm
p 



  11 .            (5) 
For each final product, each of the m  firms demands xf   units of the intermediate 
input.  For this economy, the total demand for the intermediate input is  dxfm )]()[(
1
0
 .  
Total supply of the intermediate input is  1KL .  The clearance of the market for the 
intermediate input requires that demand equals supply: 
      1
1
0
)]()[( KLdxfm .           (6) 
 We focus on a symmetric equilibrium in which the number of firms, the price, the output, 
and the consumption of all final products are the same.  In a symmetric equilibrium, Equations 
(1)-(6) form a system of six equations defining six variables p , Ip , m , x , r , and w .  An 
equilibrium is a tuple ( p , Ip , m , x , r , w ) satisfying Equations (1)-(6).  For the rest of the 
paper, the price of a final product is used as the numeraire: 1p .  With this normalization, 
returns to capital and labor are “real” as they are measured in terms of the price of a final 
product. 
 
3. Properties of the Equilibrium 
In this section, we explore the properties of the equilibrium.  Interestingly, there is a 
closed form solution for Equations (1)-(6).11  First, we conduct comparative static analysis to 
establish some properties of the model without solving Equations (1)-(6) explicitly.  This type of 
exercise is useful if no explicit solution is available.  Also, this approach shows the structure of 
the model in a clear way.  Second, we provide a closed form solution for the variables to 
establish additional properties of the equilibrium.  
                                                 
11 The reason that a closed form solution is available is because preferences are homothetic and the production 
function for the intermediate input is Cobb-Douglass.  With homothetic preference, a fixed percentage of income is 
spent on each final product.  With Cobb-Douglass production function, a fixed percentage of expenditure is spent on 
each factor of production.  As a result, the equilibrium is easier to solve. 
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To conduct comparative statics, we need to reduce the system of six equations to a 
manageable number of equations.  We arrive at the following system of three equations defining 
three variables w , r , and x  as functions of exogenous parameters: 
   0)1(1  rKwLV  ,           (7a) 
   0)( 212   xfKfLV  ,          (7b) 
   0)(3  fwLxfxV  .           (7c) 
The derivation of 31 VV   is as follows.  Dividing Equation (1) by Equation (2) leads to 
1V .  From Equation (6), the number of firms producing the same final product is given by 
)/( xfQm  .  Plugging this value of m  into Equation (5) and using Equation (3) to 
eliminate Ip  yield 
    0)( 2  fQxf  .            (8) 
 Replacing Q  in Equation (8) with  1KL  yields 2V .  Plugging )/( xfQm   into 
Equation (4) yields  
    rKwL
xf
Qx 
 
.             (9) 
 Plugging the value of Q  from Equation (8) into Equation (9) yields 
    )()( rKwLfxfx   .          (10) 
 From Equation (7a),  /)1( wLrK  .  Plugging this value of rK  into Equation (10) 
yields 3V . 
 The following proposition studies the impact of capital endowment on this economy’s 
level of output, the wage rate, and the return to capital. 
 
 Proposition 1: The output of a firm producing a final product always increases with the 
capital endowment.  The wage rate always increases with the capital endowment.  The return to 
capital increases with the amount of capital in this economy if and only if  
2
1
2
2)1(




 

 fKL .           (11) 
Proof: Differentiation of 1V , 2V , and 3V with respect to w , r , x , and K  yields 
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Since 0/1  rV , 0/2  xV , and 0/3  wV , for   denoting the determinant of the 
coefficient matrix, it is clear that 0321 






w
V
x
V
r
V .  An application of Cramer’s rule leads to 
    0/321 










w
V
K
V
r
V
dK
dx , 
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 /321321
w
V
x
V
K
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x
V
K
V
w
V
dK
dr . 
 From Equations (7a) and (7c), the return to capital can be expressed as 
)/()()1( fKxfxr   .  Using this value of r  to replace r  in KV  /1  yields 
w
V
x
V
K
V
x
V
K
V
w
V











 321321  
]2)2)(1[()()1(
2
xxf
K
xfL   . 
 Thus 0/ dKdr  if and only if 02)2)(1(  xxf  , or )2/()1(  fx  .  
Plugging the value of x  from Equation (7b) into the inequality )2/()1(  fx  , we need 
    
2
1
2
2)1(




 

 fKL .  ■ 
 
 The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows.  As capital is complementary to labor in 
the production of the intermediate input, a higher amount of capital increases the return to labor.  
When the amount of capital in this economy increases, the production of the intermediate input 
increases.  The higher level of the intermediate input could not be absorbed solely by an increase 
of the number of firms in the production of each final product.  The reason is that a firm 
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producing a final product will make a negative profit if its output does not increase while a 
higher number of competing firms leads to a lower price of a final product.  To absorb the 
additional amount of the intermediate input, the level of output for a firm producing a final 
product will be higher.  When the amount of capital increases, there are two effects working in 
opposite directions on the return to capital.  First, other things equal, a higher amount of capital 
decreases the marginal product of capital.  This decreases the return to capital.  Second, there are 
increasing returns in the production of final products.  As the output for a firm producing a final 
product increases, the average cost is lower and this increases the return to capital.  Whether the 
return to capital increases or not depends on which of the two effects is stronger.  From the 
specification of the production function of the intermediate input, a lower value of   increases 
the marginal product of capital.  When the value of   decreases, the first effect decreases and it 
can be dominated by the second effect.12  As a result, the return to capital increases with the 
amount of capital in this region. 
 The reason that the return to capital may increase with the amount of capital is the 
existence of increasing returns in the production of final products, or the existence of fixed costs 
in the production of final products.  From inequality (11), if the fixed cost is zero (no increasing 
returns to scale), the return to capital always decreases with the amount of capital in a region.  
For inequality (11), the left-hand side  1KL  is the output of the intermediate input.  Thus 
inequality (11) can be interpreted as that the level of increasing returns in the production of final 
products ( f ) is relatively high compared with the constant returns industry (the level of output 
of the intermediate input), the return to capital will increase with the amount of capital.   
 The following proposition studies the impact of the labor endowment on the output, the 
wage rate, and the return to capital. 
 
 Proposition 2: The output of a firm producing a final product always increases with the 
labor endowment.  The return to capital always increases with the labor endowment.  The return 
to labor increase with the labor endowment in this region if and only if  
                                                 
12 The right-hand side of inequality (11) goes to infinity while the left hand side is bounded if   is equal to zero.  
Thus inequality (11) will be valid if   is sufficiently small.  In the extreme case that   is equal to zero, there are 
constant returns rather than decreasing returns result for the usage of capital in the production of the intermediate 
input. 
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Proof: From Equations (7a)-(7c), we can establish the following system of three 
equations: 
0)1(1  rKwL  ,    
   0)( 212   xfKLf  ,   
   0)()1(3  Krfxfx  .     
For the above system, 1  is the same as Equation (7a), 2  is the same as Equation (7b), and 3  
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Since 0/1  w , 0/2  x , and 0/3  r , it is clear that the determinant of the 
above coefficient matrix   is negative: 0321 
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 From Equation (7c), the wage rate can be expressed as 
Lf
xfxw )(   .  Using this 
value of wage rate to replace w  in L /1  yields 
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 Because the right-hand side of inequality (12) goes to infinity while the left-hand side of 
(12) is finite when   goes to one, a higher value of   makes it more likely that the return to 
labor increases with the amount of labor in this economy.  As the right-hand side of inequality 
(11) decreases with  , a lower value of   makes it more likely that the return to capital 
increases with capital endowment in a region.  Because the left-hand sides of inequalities (11) 
and (12) are the same, with an intermediate value of  , it is possible that both the return to 
capital increases with the amount of capital and the return to labor increases with the amount of 
labor.13  In this case, capital mobility and labor mobility are reinforcing.  As capital moves into a 
region, a higher amount of capital in this region increases the return to labor in this region and 
makes labor movement into this region more desirable.   
The presence of circular causality is limited by the size of the fixed cost of production in 
the production of final products.  As the amounts of labor and capital in a region increase, if f  
does not change, inequality (11) will eventually be violated and the return to capital will 
eventually decrease.  However, the process of industrialization is associated with the continuous 
adoption of machines in production.  As illustrated vividly in Ford (1922) and discussed 
systematically in Chandler (1990), modern production is associated with the usage of machines, 
which are fixed costs.  The adoption of new technologies can lead to high levels of fixed costs.  
As fixed cost increases over time, this phenomenon of circular causality can persist over time.  
This result is consistent with the observation that city size can increase over time if technologies 
with higher levels of fixed costs are frequently introduced. 
                                                 
13 For 2/1 , the right-hand sides of inequalities (11) and (12) coincide.  Thus, the set of   such that inequalities 
(11) and (12) both hold is nonempty. 
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From the above analysis, capital does not necessarily move to a region with a lower 
capital-labor ratio because the return to capital will not necessarily be higher in a region with a 
lower amount of capital if regions have the same amount of labor.  This provides an explanation 
to the Lucas puzzle (1990) that capital does not always move from developed countries to 
developing countries. 
 From Equation (7b), the value of x  can be solved.  Then other variables can be solved.  
By solving the system of Equations (1)-(6), it can be shown that 
       11 KL
f
m , 
     fKfLx  

11 . 
From the above equations, first, the number of firms producing the same final product 
increases with the amount of capital and the amount of labor in a region and decreases with the 
level of fixed cost of producing a final product.  Second, a firm’s output decreases with the 
marginal cost in the production of a final product.  With a lower marginal cost, for a firm 
producing a final product, the level of output needed to break even is smaller. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 In this paper, we have studied the presence of circular causality in a region through factor 
returns in a general equilibrium model.  The intermediate input is produced by both capital and 
labor.  Firms producing final products engage in oligopolistic competition and there are 
increasing returns in the production of final products.  We show that the return to a factor can 
increase with the amount of this factor in a region and capital mobility and labor mobility can be 
reinforcing. 
 In this paper, we have explored some channels of circular causations of regional 
development.  There are some interesting generalizations and extensions of this model.  Here we 
briefly discuss some of them.  First, in this model, the marginal cost of a final product is 
constant.  Variable marginal cost in the production of a final product can be incorporated into the 
model.  With increasing marginal cost, the tendency for economic activities to concentrate in a 
given region will be smaller.   
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Second, in this model, there is only one type of final product.  If we name final products 
in this model as manufactured products, an agricultural product can be incorporated into the 
model.  With two types of final products, a price index based on the prices of the agricultural 
product and manufactured products can be defined (see Baldwin et al., 2003 for examples).  The 
return to a factor can be defined in terms of the price index.  The agricultural sector can be a 
constraint for the concentration of production in a region if the production of the agricultural 
product has decreasing or constant returns to scale.  With a higher amount of capital or labor in a 
region, the return to a factor in terms of the agricultural product can decrease.  However, the 
return to a factor in terms of the price index can still increase with a higher amount of a factor in 
a region.  This increase can be achieved in at least two ways.  First, if the increase of the return to 
a factor in terms of manufactured products dominates the decrease of the return to a factor in 
terms of the agricultural product, the return to a factor in terms of the price index will increase.  
Second, in a dynamic model, suppose that the level of output in the agricultural sector is affected 
by the level of agricultural technology and there are spillovers from the manufacturing sector to 
the agricultural sector in the sense that the level of agricultural technology increases with the 
level of technology in the manufacturing sector (Zhou, 2009).  If the degree of spillovers to the 
agricultural sector is strong enough, the production of the agricultural product can keep pace 
with the amount of factors in a region and the return to a factor in terms of the agricultural 
product will not decrease.  Thus the incorporation of the agricultural sector may not necessarily 
eliminate the tendency for factors of production to concentrate in given regions. 
Third, with the incorporation of one additional type of final product such as the 
agricultural product, the model can be extended to study trade between different economies.  
With the explicit modeling of trade, the impact of factor mobility on factor returns can be 
addressed.  The existence of transportation costs among regions can lead to different returns to 
factors in different regions.  The direction of capital mobility can be affected by whether a 
capital owner moves together with her capital or not. 
Fourth, in this model, firms producing final products use the same technology regardless 
of the levels of output.  A firm’s choice of technology can be incorporated into this model.  
Suppose that there are technologies with different levels of fixed and marginal costs of 
production (Zhou, 2004).  A more specialized technology has a higher fixed but a lower marginal 
cost of production.  It can be shown that that a firm producing a final product in a region with a 
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larger market size will choose a more specialized technology.  A more specialized technology 
leads to a lower average cost and thus a lower price level and thus a higher real wage.  This will 
create another channel of the circular causation process because workers will be more interested 
in moving to the region with a larger market size.   
Finally, as pointed out in Neary (2001) and Baldwin et al. (2003, chapter 19), while the 
spatial distribution of economic activities is interesting to policy makers, compared with 
theoretical research, policy implications of economic geography models have not been 
sufficiently explored.  Various policy issues such as tax competition among regions are 
interesting avenues for future research. 
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